Detection and mitigation of side channel attacks is a very important problem. Although this is an active area of research, the solutions proposed in the literature have limitations in that they do not work in a real world multi-tenancy setting on servers, have false positives or high overheads limiting their applicability. In this work, we demonstrate a compiler guided scheduler, Biscuit, which detects the cache based side channel attacks for processes scheduled on multi-tenancy server farms with very high accuracy. At the heart of the scheme is the generation and use of a cache miss model which is inserted by the compiler at the entrances of loop nests to predict the underlying cache misses. Such inserted beacons convey the cache miss information to the scheduler at run time which uses it to co-schedule processes such that their combined cache footprint does not exceed the maximum capacity of the last level cache. The scheduled processes are then monitored for actual vs predicted cache misses and when an anomaly is detected, the scheduler performs a binary search to isolate the attacker. We show that Biscuit is able to detect and mitigate Prime+Probe, Flush+Reload, and Flush+Flush attacks on OpenSSL cryptography algorithms with an F-score of 1 and also detect and mitigate degradation of service on vision application suite with an F-score of 0.92. Under no attack scenario, the scheme poses low overheads (up to a maximum of 6%). We believe that due to its ability to deal with multi-tenancy, its attack detection precision, ability to mitigate and low overheads, such a scheme is practicable.
Introduction
Modern servers are multi-core machines that run multiple processes simultaneously. These processes are protected from one another through process isolation through virtual address spaces; in addition many servers also adopt virtual machines for multi-tenancy to achieve complete software-stack isolation. The purpose of isolation is to make the memory contents or private data of one process non accessible to other processes. In spite of such mechanisms there have been attempts to gain access to private data. Private data has been leaked or attacked traditionally by exploiting memory corruption or deviating control flow of the processes through input strings [4, 30] , for which strong defense mechanisms [1, 3, 6, 7, 12, 21, 23, 42] have been used. While these mechanisms safeguard against the faults in the program itself, sidechannel attacks [9, 15, 16, 18, 20, 41] are becoming ubiquitous. Side channel attacks are a class of attacks that extract secretkey in cryptography algorithms by recording the changes in the physical properties of the machine which act as a sidechannel. The secret-key is obtained by analyzing the differential information exhibited by the physical property which is used as a side-channel. Attacks have used different physical properties of a system such as time [9, 20, 41] , power consumption [22] , memory consumption [13] , sound [8] or electromagnetic emissions [29] to leak data.
Among various side-channel attacks that leverage different physical properties, time-based attacks that utilize caches are most prevalent and are attractive for the attackers for the following reasons:
• Caches are major component of the data access pipeline used to reduce memory latency in all computer systems. Since caches are omni-present, such attacks can be staged on a wide variety of systems.
• Cache-based side-channel attacks are easier to monitor as external equipment is not required.
• The attack can be carried out remotely without accessing the machine physically which is a requirement in several other side-channel attacks.
• The attack also slows down the victim considerably, thus denying the process to service its users.
Currently, the literature describes three well-known cachebased side-channel attacks which are: Flush+Flush [9] , Prime+Probe [20] , and Flush+Reload [41] . These attacks force the victim's data out of the cache by occupying the entire cache space and then record the pattern in which the cache sets were filled in by the victim. The adversary repeats this step and then analyzes the cache access pattern to obtain the victim's secret key, which has been demonstrated successfully in [24, 31, 40, 41] . Note that even if the attacker were not able to successful in terms of analyzing the cache access pattern and retrieve the secret key, she would have still managed to slow down the victim substantially thus degrading the service of the victim. Thus, a degradation of Service (DS) attack is often one of the side effects of key-stealing attack.
Cache-based side-channel Attacks
Several cache-based side-channel attacks have been studied. Here, we elaborate on the three well-known and recent cachebased side-channel attacks.
Flush and Reload: This technique relies on identical
pages being shared between the attacker and victim processes and in particular, victims share the pages containing cryptography code or data with the attacker. The adversary also assumes selected set of cache lines can be flushed, through the invocation of certain instructions, as an example through a clflush instruction. The adversary conducts the attack in three steps. In the first step, the attacker flushes a memory line from the cache ( e.g. using the clflush instruction). The attacker waits for a fixed interval during which the victim may access the memory line bringing the memory into the cache. After the wait, the attacker accesses the same memory line. If the victim accessed the memory line, the attacker's access will require a short time. On the other hand, if the victim never accessed the line in the wait period, the attacker's access will require the memory line to be fetched from memory leading to a longer time. By continuously repeating the above steps, the attacker records the pattern of memory access by the victim which is later analyzed to deduce the secret key.
Flush and Flush:
This technique is similar to the above Flush and Reload attack with the same requirements and consists of the same first two steps. The attack takes into account that the clflush instruction aborts early when the memory line is not in the cache. By exploiting this rule, the attacker does not access the memory line in the third step. Rather, she flushes the memory line again similar to the first step. If the victim accessed the memory line in the intervening period between the first and second flush, the attacker's second flush will require a longer time because it needs to evict the line from all the caches.
On the other hand, if the victim never accessed the line in the wait period, the attacker's second flush will abort early in a shorter time. The attacker can records this trace and analyzes the differential behavior and use its results to crack the secret-key as in Flush and Reload.
3. Prime and Probe: This technique does not have any prior set-up requirements as in the previous two attacks and hence can be much more pervasive. Before the attack is initiated, the attacker creates an eviction set, which is a set of memory lines mapped to the same set, for a cache set. In the next prime step, the attacker fills the entire cache set with the memory lines from the eviction set. In second step, similar to Flush and Reload, the attacker waits for fixed interval of time during which the victim may access a memory line that is brought into the same cache set. In the next probe step, the attacker accesses the eviction set again, checking if any memory line in the eviction set has been removed from the cache by the victim. If the victim never evicted a cache line from the same cache set, then the accesses for each memory line in eviction set will be short and vice versa. Recording the victims access pattern the attacker can analyze the differential behavior.
It may be noted that regardless of the exact attack technique above, each results in a significant number of cache misses which can serve as the basis of detection of an attack. The key question to be answered however is: what is the expected behavior of normal (no-attack scenario) cache misses at a given program point during the application's dynamic execution and how can one carefully modulate the expected cache behaviors such that the departures from the same are successfully declared as attacks? Through a combination of compiler analyses that generate cache models and by carefully controlling scheduling decision, this work successfully constructs such a solution. Before we delve into the details of our scheme, we first provide a detailed survey of existing solutions citing their pros and cons.
Defense Mechanisms
The cache-based side channel attacks shown so far directly target the secret key in the cryptography algorithms which calls for a serious look into possible defense mechanisms for these attacks.
Prevention
Several cache-based side-channel attack prevention mechanisms focus on changing the cache designs such as changing cache replacement policy [39] , encrypting the cache address [26, 27] , and locking cache lines [37] . These solutions require a modification in hardware and do not apply to already existing systems and in some cases the solutions degrade the performance of applications. Such hard isolation, preventing sharing of resources that house sensitive data, in software has also been studied.
Cachebar [45] is a memory management subsystem that provides two main mechanisms against side channel attacks. The first mechanism copies pages to isolate pages from being shared among from different processes so that a victim using shared library page containing cryptography function cannot be traced by the adversary conducting the Flush and Reload attack. The second mechanism limits the number of cache lines that a process can access thus prohibiting the prime and probe based attacker from exercising the entire eviction set leaving the attacker unsure of victims accesses. However, these mechanisms are closely tied to the working of Flush and Reload and Prime and Probe attacks. The copying of pages places extra burden and also withdraws the benefits of shared libraries and limiting the cache access adversely impacts the performance of genuine processes with overheads up to 25%.
StealthMem [14] allocates isolated pages called stealth pages that map to different cache sets to each process and assumes the victim's confidential calculations and data are placed within these stealth pages. To adhere to this constraint, victim's source code must be changed. StealthMem also disallows each process from accessing a piece of cache which grows with the increase in number of cores and incurs overhead during normal execution without attacks with them incurring overheads up to 5.9%.
While Cachebar and StealthMem is a hard isolation approach, a soft isolation software solution [33] is a schedulerbased approach that disrupts the victims cache access tracing by pre-empting all the processes. The scheduler analyzes the minimum run time guarantee and schedules the process with the corresponding time slice and also performs CPU state cleansing between pre-emption in order to create a soft isolation between processes. This technique however increases the latency of each process and in server farm environments that over-provision cores [2] de-scheduling the processes and idling the machines further decreases machine utilization.
Detection and Mitigation
Several researchers have studied the detection of these attacks. Most of the detection mechanisms are software-based solutions [35, 36] that perform program analysis on binaries to model the secret key dependent memory accesses and control-flow. The model is passed to an SMT solver to detect leakage areas that can be exploited by side-channel attacks. The timings channels can be disrupted through program analysis and transformation which attempt to ensure that the CPU cycles and cache misses and hits are independent of the secret data [38] . This technique also leads to longer time for responses and throughput degradation leading to an average overhead of 50% and worse case of 225%.
Several other techniques involve runtime mechanisms [5, 17, 28, 43] that use performance counters to check for anomalies in programs. Due to underlying false positives, these runtime detection mechanisms do not mitigate the attack and leave it up to the system administrator for resolution. In addition, these techniques are closely tied to the cryptography algorithms on which they detect the attack. For example, Spydetector [17] is an anomaly detection semi-supervised mechanism to detect side-channel attacks at runtime. The attack detection mechanism builds a clustering model that learns on cache misses, cache accesses, and number of processes of the execution windows. The predicted workload level is passed to the clustering model, which raises an alarm for a possible attack if a window is not within the cluster. The clustering model is closely tied to the cryptography algorithms thus weakening the detection for algorithms with modifications and for different workloads. Moreover, the mechanism must figure out the granularity of the window that captures application phases because different applications require different window sizes thus reducing the generality of the mechanism.
In addition to just detection schemes, many software based schemes that perform mitigation after detection have also been studied. CloudRadar [43] generates a cache-access profile of the cryptography applications pertinent to the specific attacks and during program execution looks for the behaviors that match the profile to flag an attack. Next, it then migrates one of the processes or a known victim process to mitigate the attack. CloudRadar involves mechanisms that can be prone to noise such as execution profiles of cryptography applications and similarly to the cache hits or cache miss profile of known-attacks. A new unknown attack with a slightly different profile or tricky modifications in the implementation of the known-attacks decreases the strength of this mechanism. Also, the behavior of these applications can change in presence of other co-executing applications which can lead to profile mismatch thus escaping the detection radar. In a real execution environment, co-executing applications as well as variants of (known) attacks are very likely and this points to the need for a new technique.
In summary, most of the above mechanisms are either hardware-based and do not apply to existing machines, or in case of software-based solutions they reduce efficiency of caches or increase latency, or they are closely tied to the specific cryptography and cache-attack algorithms and do not apply in case of multiple co-executing applications. These mechanisms also fail to thwart the degradation of service attack by these cache-based side-channel attacks. On the other hand, current hardware counter based runtime detection mechanisms such as SypDetector suffer from relatively high false positives and also false negatives with a F-score of 0.83 with Prime and Probe and Flush and Flush attacks. CloudRadar suffers from the burden of matching execution windows of victim and attacker and with higher granularity of window incurs false-positive rate of up to 30%.
In this paper, we propose Biscuit, a compiler-assisted scheduler that in a multi-tenant environment detects any cachebased side-channel attack on any program and then mitigates the attack by de-scheduling the potential culprit thereby avoid-ing any degradation of serice (DS) attack. The potential culprit is scheduled back and is allowed to run to completion when all other processes have finished their execution. As noted earlier, Biscuit relies on the fact that the victims of cachebased side-channel attack incur a significantly larger number of cache-misses compared to normal execution as shown in Figure 1 . The number of cache misses is atleast five times that of the normal execution. In order to detect the cache behavior anomaly, Biscuit must first answer the question of cache misses expected at a given program point during the application's normal (no attack) execution with a significant accuracy. For this purpose, Biscuit first generates a cache-miss model for every loop using compiler analysis which is then inserted in the application. During the execution, this model transmits evaluated values of cache misses to the scheduler for each executing process. The scheduler then leverages the predicted cache-misses information to make scheduling decisions because the predicted cache-misses are mainly due to cold misses incurred by accessing unique memory. This ensures that the predicted cache footprints of the scheduled processes always fit within the last-level cache (LLC) and its capacity is not exceeded. Such a scheduling decision therefore ensures that the deviations from predicted cache misses are not caused due to cache capacity being exceeded. Since the predicted cache misses are supposed to be closer to the actual ones due to such scheduling decisions under multitenancy, the departures from the predicted behaviors must be attributable to some other reasons, viz. attacks. During the execution, the scheduler monitors the cache-misses to check if the cache miss prediction is violated for a given process. Upon encountering such a scenario, the scheduler through a careful binary search, isolates the culprit responsible for cache-misses in victim.
We evaluated Biscuit on all the above three cache-based side-channel attacks on OpenSSL's implementation of AES, RSA, and ECSDA cryptography algorithms in a multi-tenant environment. Biscuit was able to catch all attacks on cryptography algorithms with no false positives. We also checked the usefulness of these techniques on the San Diego Computer Vision benchmarks to see if we can catch degradation of service (DS) attacks on them. On these benchmarks as well, all the attacks were caught, however there were a few false positives.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• A predictive cache miss-model for each loop based on loop bounds
• A scheduler that leverages the expected cache-miss information and schedules effectively not to degrade runtime cache behavior and which detects cache-based sidechannel attacks by pinpointing and de-scheduling the attacker.
• An evaluation of our scheduler using three well-known side-channel attacks on OpenSSL's cryptography algo- • A demonstration that we are able to catch these attacks in a multi-tenant environment with attack-agnostic models and overheads of less than 6% under no attack scenario.
Caches have been used in multiple ways to leak secret-key of cryptography algorithms, for example in HIDE [46] , the attacker used the cache to induce differential address information on the address bus to leak the secret-key. This attack requires physical access to the machine to snoop on the address bus. We focus on the time-based cache attacks in this work, however, attacks shown in HIDE on the unmodified hardware can also be caught by our technique since they result in higher cache misses to begin with. Cache has also been used as a side-channel to leak data in the well-known attacks such as spectre, meltdown [10, 16, 18, 32] , but these attacks exploit some other architectural features such as speculative execution to attack and only use cache as a micro-architectural covert channel to transmit the data. In particular, they do not target the victim's cache and hence tackling them is outside the scope of this work.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the entire framework. In Section 3, we explain the cache-miss model followed by beacon framework that interact with the scheduler in Section 4. We explain the Biscuit Scheduler in Section 5 and provide a detailed account of evaluation in Section 6. In Section 7, we present some prior mechanisms against cache-based sidechannel attacks and conclude in Section 8.
Overview
To catch the cache-based side-channel attacks, Biscuit relies on the fact that the victim experiences a significantly larger number of cache-misses while being attacked than during normal execution. To establish the expected number of cache-misses during normal execution, Biscuit first builds a cache-miss model with the help of the compiler for every loop because the phases of execution during which cache-misses are experienced in an application are well-categorized by the loops in the program. Every loop in the application is then prefixed with a cache-miss model, which learns the cachemisses with respect to the loop properties through training over the input data sets. Generation and insertion of the cache model before the loop nests forms the compilation phase of Biscuit. All applications, except the attacker must go through the compilation phase for effective scheduling such that dynamic cache contention is minimal under normal (no attack) execution. Cache-misses can also be calculated through analytical models [11] . However, these models can handle only affine accesses and model simple caches.
In the runtime phase, the cache-miss model infers the cache-misses of each loop before executing the loop. This predicted information is passed onto the scheduler, which first schedules the processes such that there is no cache-contention between the co-executing processes. Then the scheduler monitors the cache misses while the loops in the applications execute. If the loop experiences cache misses more than the predicted cache-misses, then the scheduler performs a binary search over all the executing processes to catch the plausible culprit causing the cache-misses. The culprit is then descheduled until all the executing processes finish after which it is scheduled back.
Threat Models and Goals
Within a multi-tenant environment the cache-based sidechannel attacks are more decisive, that is the cache-misses can result from co-executing processes and not from an attack, and proposed solution mechanisms are either hardware-based or induce runtime overhead or hard to apply in such an environment with low false negatives and false positives. We assume a multi-tenant environment with a mix of various applications such that they do not overload the system and any process that needs more than available resources is rescheduled onto a different node. Server farms utilize less than 50% of the machines by over-provisioning [2] and cluster scheduler can be invoked to reschedule the process onto another node in the cluster. We assume that the plausible victim process are compiled through Biscuit compiler which inserts a cache-miss model on top of every loop. Other process in the system are compiled with the Biscuit compiler for effective scheduling with no contention of cache resource. The attacker may or may not be compiled with Biscuit compiler. The Biscuit scheduler uses the compiler inserted cache-miss information to efficiently schedule the co-executing process onto the available cores such that the processes' combined memory footprint fit the cache. We assume a trusted compiler inserts valid cache miss model and the process does not falsify the information provided to the scheduler. A secure handshake based on a secret-key mechanism is commonly used in such scenarios. The goal of the scheduler is to detect any cache-based side-channel attack on any victim process and find the plausible culprit process and de-schedule it with high F-score.
Cache Miss Model
We develop a linear-regression model to predict the cache misses for a loop. For a given loop, with enough training input for different loop iterations of a loop, the pattern of cache misses is amplified with the increase in number of iterations. Thus for a given loop, cache misses is directly proportional to the number of loop iterations, such that
where CM is the cache misses for a loop which takes N loop iterations and α is the constant. In the case of nested loops, the cache misses depend on the number of iterations for each nested loop. The cache misses for entire loop is a function of the loop iterations of the nested loop, such that
where CM is the cache misses for the loop nest with N j being the number of loop iterations for each nested loop j. We normalize the loops by running LLVM compiler's loopsimplify pass. The loop-simplify pass transforms the loop to start from lower bound set to zero and then increment by one till the loop bound. Loop simplification normalizes for and while loops, which do not have a data-dependent terminating conditions. For example, the loop in Code 1 is normalized to Code 2. 
where lb j = N j and lb j is the loop bound for the j loop inside the loop nest. Each nested loop will individually add to the cache misses so we can transform the equation 2 into CM = f 1 (lb 1 ) + f 2 (lb 1 , lb 2 ) + · · · + f n (lb 1 , lb 2 , . . . , lb n ),
which is equivalent to CM = α 1 * lb 1 + α 2 * lb 1 * lb 2 + · · · + α n * lb 1 * lb 2 * · · · * lb n . (5) Through linear regression, we get each coefficient α k plus a constant term α 0 representing the y-intercept.
We record the cache misses for a loop by reading the performance counters during the execution of the loop. To record this data, our LLVM pass instruments perf to start monitoring cache misses before the loop and stop monitoring after the loop. Loops for which loop bounds cannot be extracted statically, we profile the loop iterations during the training runs for collecting cache-miss data. The cache misses and the number of loop iterations are fed to scikit-learn's linear regression [25] to learn a linear cache-miss regression model as in Equation 5 for each loop.
The linear model will only predict a single value for the cache misses, but because of non-determinism cache-misses varies even for the same loop with same iterations when executed several times. The variance is different for small and large loop bounds. To accommodate for deviation due to non-determinism, we calculate the standard deviation over multiple runs for each loop and then determine the maximum ratio of standard deviation to the average cache misses,i.e.
where σ l is the standard deviation of each loop l and cm l is the average cache misses of the corresponding loop. This ratio is then appended to the predicted value in Equation 5 to account for non-determinism as
where CM(U) is the upper bound on the cache misses. Note that, we do not need a lower bound on cache misses because for the attack to be flagged the cache misses must exceed CM(U) and any misses within the upper bound can be safely considered as safe execution. The linear model 5 along with upper bound equation 7 is instrumented before the loop header in the LLVM intermediate code (IR). During runtime, these equations are evaluated and CM(U) is passed on as beacons to the scheduler. The cache miss model serves two purposes for the biscuit scheduler. One it is used to check if a process is experiencing cache misses more than it should and secondly, to schedule the process with as minimal cache-contention for which the scheduler uses the cache-miss information as the cache/memory footprint of the process. When a process is executed to be profiled with no other co-executing processes the unique memory accesses results in cache misses, the misses due to conflicts are avoided because of efficient hash mechanisms that utilize the entire cache, and any capacity misses means the cache size is insufficient for the process and the process must be run alone or de-scheduled as per the scheduling logic explained in Section 5. Hence the predicted cache misses can be used as memory footprint for all purposes of scheduling.
Beacons
The cache miss equations are inserted in the pre-header of the loop. These equations are resolved using the run time loop bound values to predict the entire loop's cache misses. The predicted cache misses value is passed to the scheduler through function calls to a library called beacons. The library interfaces with the scheduler through shared memory in our implementation but other secure communication channels can be employed.
These beacons are classified based on the precision of the loop bound information for the loop. The imprecision of the data emerges from the type of loops. Many loops iterate for a fixed number of times determined by the loop bounds which can be compile-time unknowns, but still loop invariant. However, some loops terminate based on some data-dependent condition and the number of loop iterations for such loops cannot be resolved at the pre-header of the loop. It is also difficult to calculate the loop iterations for loops with non-affine control variables (loop bounds or loop index). Based on the precision of the loop bound information in turn the cachemiss information passed on to the scheduler, the beacons are classified as Precise or Expected Beacons. 
. The cache misses based on equation 5 for this triangular loop is
.
Expected Beacon
The Expected beacon type is of loops with loop bounds that are either data dependent or loop control variables that are non-affine. For these loops, the loop bound is either not known before the execution of the loop as in data dependent loop or cannot be calculated because of the limitations of the compiler tools as in non-affine loops. For example, the below loop bound Code 5 is data dependent and the number of loop iterations is only known after the loop terminates. For such loops, we calculate expected cache-misses by using average loop iterations value collected from the training phase of the cache-miss model. The expected value when plugged into Equation 5, the cache-misses for this loop is given by
where E is the expected loop bound. If the loop nest consists of both precise and expected loops, then the loop is classified on the type of outermost loop as either expected or precise, accordingly.
Both precise and expected beacons are first inserted in the loop nest pre-header. However, the parent function of this loop nest can be called inside some other functions' loop nest which can result in multiple beacon calls to the scheduler. In such cases we interprocedurally hoist the beacon calls outside the caller function's outermost loop. However, due to such hoisting, the beacon loop bound variable information required for precise beacons may not be available at the external loop nest pre-headers (since it may be interprocedurally defined inside the callee function). In some cases, a backward interprocedural slice can be used to determine the inner loop bound but in other cases, estimates must be used. For the latter case, the precise beacons are converted to expected beacons and the expected loop iterations are used instead at the external loop nest pre-header. The LLVM beacon pass also inserts a completion beacon at each exit of the loop nest. This completion beacon only tells the scheduler that the loop has ended.
In other words, beacons communicate dynamic regions of executions (loops) to the scheduler along with expected cache misses using the hoisted cache model.
Biscuit Scheduler
The biscuit scheduler uses the information sent by the beacon for two purposes. One, the scheduler uses the predicted cache misses to efficiently schedule the processes on the available cores such that cache contention is minimal among the simultaneously executing processes. When cache-misses are profiled with no other co-executing process, the total cachemisses are roughly equal to the memory footprint of the executing process or in this case the executing loop region. First, the Biscuit scheduler must ensure that the total expected cache footprint of all the co-executing applications does not exceed the LLC (last level cache) capacity. This ensures that the predicted cache misses roughly equal dynamic cache misses for each scheduled application under normal (no attack) conditions. Secondly, the scheduler uses the predicted cache misses to detect a plausible attack when the monitored cache misses of an application exceeds the predicted cache misses. Because the scheduler avoids cache contention, cache misses of the application will mostly exceed because of an attacker conducting a cache-based side-channel attack. These two core duties of the Biscuit scheduler are elucidated below.
Scheduling
The scheduler starts by scheduling one process on to each core of every socket in the machine thus scheduling every new process on a free core. As the processes execute, the beacons are fired. These beacons are processed by the scheduler. The scheduler knows the number of sockets, number of cores per socket and the cache size of each socket. On receiving a beacon, the scheduler checks if the memory footprint (predicted cache-misses) fits the available cache size. For the very first beacon, the available cache size is the cache size of the socket the process is executing on. The available cache size is updated by subtracting the cache requirements of the subsequently executing beacon of a scheduled process.
On next successive beacons the processes are allowed to continue on the socket if the memory footprint (predicted cache misses) is less or equal to the available cache. If the available cache in the socket does not meet the requirements of the beacon, then the scheduler first checks for a free core ensuring that there is enough free cache available on other sockets. If these conditions are not satisfied then the scheduler greedily tries to swap a process from another socket with this process such that the cache requirements of both the processes is satisfied. If the scheduler cannot relocate the process, then the process is de-scheduled owing to a lack of adequate resources. At this point, we assume the process can be scheduled on to another node in a cluster if needed.
Detection and Mitigation of Side-Channel Attacks
On receiving a beacon, the scheduler first schedules the process appropriately and simultaneously starts monitoring the cache-misses incurred by the process. For each beacon process, the scheduler keeps examining if the cache misses are less than the predicted caches misses regularly. On observing a process exceeding the predicted cache misses the scheduler is alerted of a plausible attack on the process, which is now a plausible victim. Since the scheduler has managed to schedule the process such that cache contention due to co-execution is minimal, the scheduler expects the actual cache misses experienced by the process to be within the predicted upper bound CM(U) as in Equation 7 . To catch the plausbile attacker and mitigate the attack, the scheduler conducts a binary search on the executing processes as in Algorithm 1.
The last level cache is shared among the processes within the same socket. So, the plausible attacker must be executing on the same socket as the victim. The scheduler conducts a binary search using misses per thousand instructions (MPKI) calculated over a period of 10 ms to catch the attacker. After recording the current MPKI, the scheduler de-schedules half of the executing processes other than the victim (which is detected due to its dynamic cache misses being higher than the expected value) .The scheduler checks if the new MPKI is less than the previously recorded MPKI. If so, then the plausible attacker must be in the de-scheduled process set. In such a scenario, the scheduler switches the currently scheduled processes with the de-scheduled process with the victim intact and rechecks MPKI if it decreases. If the plausible attacker was already in the scheduled set, then it further carries out a split and again isolating the attacker and victim to the same subset. In short, the scheduler manages to reduce the number of processes to half with victim and attacker still intact and executing. The scheduler repeats the above step till only two processes remain in the scheduled set, a plausible attacker and victim. Two interesting outcomes are possible at this stage. If the victims' MPKI decreases on de-scheduling the other process, then the de-scheduled process is the plausible attacker. However, if the MPKI does not decrease, then the victim was a beacon process but also an attacker who was masquerading as a victim. The victim process in this case, fired a beacon with predicted cache misses, however, the information could be simply false or the victim was hijacked through a control data or non-control data attack and was used in carrying out the attack. The scheduler is able to catch such attackers as well. These cases are checked in the Algorithm which describes the necessary details.
Some other details of the scheduling scheme are as follows. Once the loop completion beacon is fired after exiting a loop in a scheduled process, the available cache size is also updated accordingly and performance counter monitoring is paused and reset. The monitoring is resumed at the next bea-con. When all the scheduled processes finish executing the plausible attacker is re-scheduled because the process may be wrongly classified as an attacker (which might happen due to inaccuracies in cache miss prediction) and therefore such a process should be allowed to complete. Since no other processes are scheduled such a process should progress and complete. But if the process does not complete and other processes are in queue to be scheduled, then the plausible attacker will be de-scheduled again. At this point, further forensic examination can be conducted on the plausible attacker. Our results show that our attack detection techniques are 100 % accurate on the cryptography benchmarks and we have very few false positives for the DS attacks for San Diego Vision benchmarks. attacker ← victim 15: prevMPKI ← GETMPKI(victim)
Algorithm 1 Mitigation Algorithm

16:
DESCHEDULE_PROCESS(1 − (#process/2)) 17: newMPKI ← GETMPKI(victim)
18:
if newMPKI < prevMPKI then 19: RESUME_PROCESS(1 − (#process/2)) 20 :
DESCHEDULE_PROCESS((#process/2 + 1) − #process) 21 :
MITIGATE_ATTACKER(victim) 22: else 23:
MITIGATE_ATTACKER(victim)
Evaluation
The experiments were conducted on Dell PowerEdge R440 server which is equipped with Intel Xeon Gold 5117 processor clocked at 2.00 GHz. Dell PowerEdge R440 has two sockets, each consisting of 14 cores and 11-way associative 19 MB LLC. We decided to carry our experiments with up to 18 jobs utilizing 18 cores of the machine a little over 50% utilization in accordance with our threat model (it may be noted that the server farms have an utilization of less than 50% to effectively give SLA (service level agreement) guarantees). Other daemon process executing on the machine should not disturb the experiments as more free cores are available. The server OS is Ubuntu 18.04 with 4.15 linux kernel and our baseline scheduler is the Completely Fair Scheduler (CFS), the default linux scheduler. We use scikit-learn to build the cache-miss model. We write the compiler passes in LLVM 3.8 to collect the training data for cache-miss model and then insert and hoist the model.
Benchmarks:
The cache-based side-channel attacks have been successful in extracting the secret keys of cryptography algorithms. We use OpenSSL's implementation of AES, RSA, and ECDSA to demonstrate the working of Biscuit in catching the cache-based side-channel attacks. Each cryptography algorithm encrypts and then decrypts random strings of random lengths with a random secret key. To show that Biscuit can successfully detect and mitigate the cache-based side-channel attacks in a multi-tenant environment, we run several image analysis and processing applications from San Diego Vision Benchmarks Suite [34] alongside the cryptography applications to simulate a real world job mix on server farms. We show that Biscuit catches cache-based side-channel attacks on cryptography algorithms with all three different attacks namely-Prime and Probe, Flush and Reload, and Flush and Flush. In case of non-crypto applications, the attacks manage to degrade the service of the victim by inducing huge number of cache misses in the victim. Biscuit can even detect such degradation of service attacks. We also show the effectiveness of Biscuit against degradation of service using Flush and Reload on SDVBS.
Attack Setup: Flush and Reload and Flush and Flush attacks require sharing of pages between the victim. These attacks map the shared library into its virtual address space. Although Prime and Probe attack does not require sharing of pages with the victim, the page sharing makes it easier to create the eviction sets. We share the libcrypto library for OpenSSL for the side-channel attacks. For degradation of service attack on SDVBS, we create a libsdcommon library from the common folder consisting of general functions in SDVBS. We also profile the libraries to find the library code address range that is used by the benchmarks. These ranges make it easier for the attacker to know the exact pages to attack for the information. As the first step, Prime and Probe must build an eviction set, a set of addresses that belong to the same cache set, from physical addresses. It accesses its pagemap to figure out the conversion from virtual address to physical address. The attacker chooses 11 physical addresses (because 11-way associative cache) to create the eviction set to prime the cache and probe it later.
Evaluation Method:
We create different configuration consisting of different applications ranging from 3 to 18 in number to test the Biscuit scheduler versus the CFS. We first test the scheduler efficiency in terms of the performance of the applications scheduled without the attacker. Note that even without the attacker, Biscuit monitors the cache misses and regularly checks for attacks. Then we test the ability of the scheduler to catch the attack. In this test, we add the attack to the configuration. When demonstrating attack over OpenSSL, we use applications from SDVBS as co-executing applications and vice-versa. For example, to test an attack on AES in a configuration of three processes, we used SVM from SDVBS and the attack as the co-executing process. Benchmarks F-Score OpenSSL 1 SDVBS 0.9230769231 Table 1 : F-Score
Cache Model Accuracy
The cache-model accuracy depends on the training data and the types of loops. For OpenSSL, we use random strings of different lengths and random secret-keys for training and the randomness persits even for testing. For SDVBS, we leverage the input data sets provided with the suite for training and testing. The model predicted value is further compromised in the case of expected beacons in which the loop bounds used in the model are expected loop bound obtained during training and not the actual iterations. Since, we use the standard deviation ratio as in Equation 7 to predict cache-misses, we account the k * CM to get the error in prediction with test data. The average accuracy is 95% as shown in Figure 2 .
In each OpenSSL application, random strings of various lengths with random secret-key are encrypted and decrypted multiple times. The number of times the algorithm runs is different in case of training versus testing. For example, one application was run for 5000 times during training versus 7500 times during testing. While the accuracy is 100% for AES, it is 96% for RSA and ECDSA. During the runs with the Biscuit scheduler, the attacks on OpenSSL are always caught because the attacker is causing cache misses even when the cache is just being warmed up for the loop leading to very high cache misses. Once the attacker is caught, the cache is already warmed up and the execution continues normally. Therefore all cache-based side-channel attacks are caught by Biscuit scheduler and the attacker is isolated with 100% accuracy using the scheduling Algorithm 1 described earlier without besmirching a normal process. In other words, all attacks are caught with no false positives and false negative leading to an F-Score of 1.
SDVBS has different image sizes-test, sim, sqcif, qcif, cif, vga, and fullhd. We mostly use cif and vga for training and test on fullhd because these sizes are large enough to cause atleast some cache misses for each loop compared to the first four that execute without causing cache misses due to small loop bound. However, three applications (localization, svm, and multi_ncut) do not have fullhd or vga data. Hence, localization is trained on qcif and cif and tested on vga. Svm and multi_ncut are trained on sqcif and qcif and tested on cif. Because image sizes are small, svm finishes way too fast for the attacker to attack the process although the cache model has high accuracy. However, multi_ncut takes minutes for cif data image so this benchmark is easily attacked. These issues cause fluctuations in the accuracy of cache miss prediction which also lead to few false positives when co-executing with more than 12 processes for two benchmarks leading to an F- 
Detection Efficiency
The schedulers' efficiency in catching these side-channel attacks is determined by how early was the attacker caught; the earlier an attack is caught the better, since this limits the attacker's ability to extract more information on the secret key. With this motivation, we define the detection efficiency as D = 1 − Attack active time Total time of victim (11) where Attack active time is the duration from when the attack started to the time when the attack was caught. Since all processes are started simultaneously, the above equation signifies the ratio of time the victim executed relieved of the attacker or in other words the time the victim was not under attack after the adversary started executing. Detection efficiency of 100% means the attacker was detected before any attack happened and 0% means the attacker was not detected at all during the attack.
In case of cache-based side-channel attack on OpenSSL as shown in Figure 9 , we can see that the attack was caught early in all the algorithms except Prime+Probe because Prime+Probe causes cache misses in the victim very slowly compared to Flush+Reload or Flush+Flush. Also comparatively Prime+Probe utilizes only one memory address because more memory addresses mean more eviction sets that take memory space and time to initialize. Overall on an average the scheduler detects the cache-based side-channel attack before the attacker can leak more than 50% of the secret-key.
In case of degradation of service attack on SDVBS as shown in Figure 10 , the detection efficiency is really low due to two reasons. The first reason is the shared library's attack memory lines might not be used a lot by the victim. Our beacon is hoisted at the outerloop and the misses take time to accumulate so the attack gets detected late. The second reason is the program has a short execution time so the attack is detected very late because it needs to accumulate misses. For few cases in which the cache model is less accurate, the attacker can still be detected because the predicted misses are exceeded and the scheduler starts mitigation using MPKI. However, in few cases the program executes too fast for any detection and mitigation of the attacker. In two particular cases, svm and mser benchmark finished executing even before the attacker caused cache-misses. Overall on average the detection efficiency is less than 25% but the scheduler saves these applications from the attacker.
Performance
The timing differences between Biscuit and CFS for OpenSSL and few SDVBS benchmarks are shown in Figure 3 As mentioned before, Biscuit catches the cache-based attacks in all the benchmarks. Since MSER and SVM execute for a very short time, these benchmarks could not be attacked. The cache misses in the Biscuit scheduler which detected and mitigated the attack versus CFS which did not mitigate the attack is shown in Figures 5 to 8 . In the case of OpenSSL, the cache misses decrease by 5x except for the Prime and Probe attack which had its shortcomings as explained before. In SDVBS, the longer programs also had a large decrease in their cache misses. For MSER and SVM, they looked identical to CFS Flush+Reload because there is no attack due to them completing very fast. Other observations include lines overlapping and the Biscuit scheduler sometimes having more misses than CFS with attack in SDVBS. The lines overlapping like in Figure 6 for Flush+Reload is not actually an overlap. The two graphs have different values but the CFS attack has a lot of misses causing the other two lines to get combined based on the y-axis. Biscuit scheduler has more misses in few cases where a process falsely got flagged as an attack and got de-scheduled. Once they are re-scheduled, they have to rewarm their cache creating more misses. The other reason being the non-determinism of the program with cache misses that caused Biscuit to have more misses like in Prime + Probe for AES. Overall, Biscuit defends against cache-based sidechannel and degradation of service attacks with an overhead of less than 6% during normal (no attack) execution.
Related Work
There has been a lot of research in cache-based side channel attacks. The research can be categorized based on software or hardware approaches and can be further divided based on the methods such as prevention, detection, or mitigation.
Cache-mapping partitions the cache to make it harder for attackers to figure out address which belong to same set. Some methods such as [26, 27] encrypt the memory addresses using secret keys that are stored in isolated memory. This requires additional memory and the key must be changed regularly. Other methods uses randomness in cache replacement policy to avoid the attacker from mapping the cache sets like RP-Cache [37] and NewCache [19] . However, these do not scale with Last-Level Cache.
In addition to cache-mapping, line-locking like PLcache [37] locks cache lines such that the attacker cannot evict these cache lines. This reduces the cache space available for processes. SHARP [39] only evicts cache lines that are not available in L1 or L2 caches of any process. This method requires changing hardware to allow more communication between L1, L2, and LLC caches. In addition, SHARP throws an alarm which needs to be caught by the OS and can be false positive.
Some methods require disrupting the time signals so that the attacker cannot use the timing methods. Some approaches take programs and disrupt the cycles by buffering extra instructions [38] . The two programs are identical in terms of functionality but the extra instructions means slower execution. Other methods add noise frequently to programs [44] . This method works for L1 caches but not for Last-level caches because the attacker is basing his assumption on the virtual addresses.
These mechanisms and the ones compared against in introduction either require hardware changes or do hard isolation leading to cache reservation for the defense mechanism or do incur many false positives and negatives. Biscuit solves these problems with a cache-miss model tailored at the granularity of loop and the scheduler that first schedules efficiently and then detects and mitigates any cache-based side-channel attacks and degradation of service.
Conclusion
In this work, we demonstrate a compiler guided scheduler Biscuit which detects the cache based side channel attacks for processes on multi-tenancy server farms with very high accuracy. We show that Biscuit is able to detect and mitigate Prime+Probe, Flush+Reload, and Flush+Flush attacks on OpenSSL cryptography algorithms with an F-score of 1 and also detect and mitigate degradation of service on vision application suite with an F-score of 0.92 Under no attack scenario, the scheme poses low overheads (upto a maximum of 6%). At the heart of the scheme is the generation and use of a cache miss model which is inserted by the compiler at the entrances of loop nests to predict the underlying cache misses. The beacons convey such an information to the scheduler which uses them to co-schedule processes such that their combined cache footprint does not exceed the maximum capacity of the last level cache. The scheduled processes are monitored for cache misses and when an anomaly is detected, the scheduler performs a binary search to isolate the attacker. We believe that due to its ability to deal with multi-tenancy, its precision and low overheads, such a scheme is practicable.
